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Executive Summary 
The IDRC’s “Corporate Strategy and Program Framework” (CSPF) for 2000-2005, 
describes the subject areas where IDRC will support research. While the topics selected 
may be strategic because they respond to IDRC’s external opportunities and the strength 
of its staff, they do not respond to IDRC’s external threats and internal weaknesses. 
Despite some notable successes, IDRC is virtually unknown among most Canadian 
taxpayers and elected officials. Moreover, one might expect more visible improvements 
in the lives of the poor, arising from 30 years of IDRC work, and more than $3 billion in 
research grants. These factors represent a danger that the Canadian government could 
eliminate the IDRC or merge it with CIDA.  IDRC-supported research has not yet 
attained its full potential of achieving measurable results. This is because of insufficient 
project monitoring, a lack of attention to the dissemination and implementation of its 
research results, and insufficient geographic focus. A five-year strategic plan that 
eliminates these three weaknesses is proposed. It is also recommended that IDRC 
standardize a formal strategic planning process that responds to critical issues in a pro-




The document critiques the existing strategy of the International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC), and proposes a more effective one. 
Problem  
IDRC is a Canadian funded organization that supports scientists in developing countries 
to conduct research that will help solve their social, economic and environmental 
problems.  While IDRC is a crown corporation, it was set up to operate at arms-length 
from the Canadian government, thus giving its operations considerable independence. 
In addition to its head-office in Ottawa, IDRC has seven offices in the South:  Singapore, 
New Delhi, Cairo, Dakar, Nairobi, Johannesburg and Montevideo. IDRC’s $85 million 
annual budget is used to support its recipients as well as to cover the salaries of its 
Program Officers (POs) – specialists, who help develop the research proposals, monitor 
the research projects and help guide the work.  IDRC’s POs are often leading experts in 
their fields, and, over the years, IDRC has earned a strong reputation among the 
development community both internationally and within Canada. 
Notable successes include helping the mass democratic movement in South Africa 
prepare for a post-Apartheid state, and developing a disease resistant variety of Canola 
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for China, as well as technology to harvest drinking water from fog for remote 
communities in Chile. 
Scope 
This document describes IDRC’s current strategy and then critiques it, while 
simultaneously building the groundwork for a new strategy.  The following framework 
for analysis is employed: business and competitive environment, organizational size-up, 
positioning analysis, synthesis, defining direction and taking action.  
 
Description of IDRC 
Strategy 
As shown in Exhibit I, IDRC has a five-year strategy entitled “Corporate Strategy and 
Program Framework” (CSPF) for 2000 – 2005. CSPF describes IDRC’s corporate goals 
arising from its parliamentary mandate, while outlining the subject areas where IDRC 
will offer research support, including social and economic equity and natural resources 
management, and the rationale behind the choices. It also offers guiding principles about 
how the Centre will work.  The development of the CSPF was a strategic exercise, but 
responds only to IDRC’s opportunities and strengths. It does not respond to IDRC’s 
external threats or its internal weaknesses. Yet a lack of response to these threats and 
weaknesses may threaten IDRC’s very existence as an institution, and may result in 
further cuts to its budget, threatening IDRC’s ability to deliver programming outlined in 
its five-year CSPF. The CSPF, then, is an insufficient strategy for IDRC. 
While it has not proactively responded to the threats and weaknesses with a holistic, 
formal strategy, IDRC is reacting to some of them with disparate, ad-hoc activities.   
Some of these activities are written down in formal and informal documents, others in 
memoranda, and some not at all.   
The analysis that follows will be used to more methodically critique the development of 
the CSPF, and to build a new strategy. 
 
Description and Analysis 
Business and Competitive Environment 
PEST 
For the CSPF, the Centre analyzed changes to its external environment affected by 
political, economic, social and technological factors. It emphasized an increase in 
nationalism and fundamentalism, a drop in global aid flows by more than 20 per cent 
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during the 1990s, and revolutionary developments in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs). However, the Centre did not identify the most important change to 
its environment within Canada – a cut in the total foreign aid budget by more than 50 per 
cent between 1994 and 1999. IDRC’s budget decreased from $130 million in 1994 to $85 
million in 1999.   
Forces driving industry competition 
In the CSPF, IDRC did outline the approach of other donors, but not strategically.  It 
correctly views other donors as partners, but does not also perceive them as competitors 
for aid budgets, both from within Canada and from other bilateral and multilateral 
donors.  Nor does the Centre explicitly recognize that the main criterion used by donors 
to select a development organization for funding is the perception a program’s ability to 
alleviate poverty.   
Competitive strategies  
In preparing its CSPF, IDRC analyzed competitive strategies for achieving development 
results.  The most important strategy is scientific innovation, with which IDRC excels, 
because this encompasses the Centre’s mandate. IDRC also recognizes the potential of 
information and communication technologies in helping achieve development results, 




IDRC has done an excellent job outlining its mission and purpose — to empower 
scientists in developing countries to solve their own problems.  IDRC often uses the 
following metaphor: feeding a hungry man will allay his hunger for a day, while teaching 
him how to fish will allay his hunger for a lifetime.  This mission is well understood by 
IDRC staff and partners, and by Canadian politicians and the public, when it is explained 
to them. 
 
IDRC also understands that its competitive advantage is the core-skills of its POs, who 
freely share their knowledge, and can unleash the great potential in its recipients by 




Many IDRC staff members from all levels believe that the Centre’s clients are the 
researchers we support, or the poor in developing countries.  This is untrue. The poor are 
our beneficiaries, and the researchers are our partners, but our clients are those that pay 
our bills — Canadian taxpayers through the government of Canada.  We create value by 
demonstrating the positive impact aid has on the poor, thereby making Canadians feel 
good about their contribution.  Public surveys consistently demonstrate high support for 
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foreign aid when it is clear the aid gets results. This means that IDRC’s product must go 
beyond the research grants and broaden its focus to include concrete research results, 
changes in government policies, and improvements in the lives of the poor. This requires 
a greater focus on project monitoring to ensure that researchers receive adequate 
guidance, so that optimal results are attained. Dissemination of the research results to 
decision-makers in developing countries, and to other donors, is essential, so that the 
results of the research can be implemented.  IDRC has historically focused on the 
research and left the dissemination, especially the policy-uptake, to other donors. While 
the second objective of the CSPF is dissemination and policy-uptake, no specific action 
plan was developed to achieve this, and it is far from clear that IDRC staff, Board of 
Directors, and Senior Management have bought into this idea.  
IDRC has not had much success selling its product. Few Canadian taxpayers are even 
aware that IDRC exists, despite its noteworthy successes.  IDRC does have a strong Web 
site and public affairs department that arranges media interviews and coverage of IDRC 
projects and POs. And this year, for the first ever, IDRC held an open-house market day, 




IDRC did not conduct a comprehensive SWOT analysis when it formulated its CSPF (a 
SWOT is included in Exhibit II).   
The elimination of the federal deficit, which may result in a stable or even growing 
economy, presents a major opportunity for IDRC.  However, because IDRC has attained 
a small number of development successes, and because it is relatively unknown among 
Canadians, it could face greater cuts or may even be eliminated all together.  
Internally, IDRC does recognize that its greatest strengths are its POs, who are often 
more knowledgeable than their counterparts at other development organizations, and 
more able to explain IDRC’s mission in a manner that ensures public support.   
IDRC does recognize that its financial performance over the last couple of years has not 
been strong, and that it has been weak in implementing its research results.  However, 
IDRC has not acknowledged that to do this, it must deal directly with policy-makers 
including politically powerful people in developing countries. Nor does it recognize that 
other donor agencies, even other Canadian organizations such as CIDA, are usually not 
interested in implementing IDRC’s research, and that it must do this itself. IDRC also 
does not recognize that despite the excellence of its staff, project monitoring has 
deteriorated in recent years. Program Officers, who are pressed for time and who’s long-
term vision is limited by a yearly budget, have been more focused on developing the next 
project than on monitoring the ones they implemented last year.  Nor does IDRC 
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recognize the link between this insufficient monitoring and its relatively few successes. 
The vast majority of research projects supported have not achieved real measurable 
results. Given the nature of research and the nature of the researchers IDRC supports, 
very few of its projects can be expected to be unqualified successes.  However, with over 
30 years of operation experience including 3,000 research grants totaling $3 billion, far 
more successes would have been possible had the recipients been better helped through 
more careful monitoring.  Finally, IDRC does not fully appreciate that its programming is 
stretched over too many countries.   
 
Strategy:  What is make-or-break and positioning? 
 
Within five years, IDRC must demonstrate to Canadians concrete results arising from the 
implementation of high-quality research. IDRC needs to develop a complete and 
marketable product. Thus, IDRC’s make-or-break issues over the next five years are to 
lay the groundwork leading to better quality research results, achieve them, and then 
implement these results to ensure the lives of the poor will be visibly improved.  
 
The key to this strategy is the first step — obtaining better results from each research 
project it funds, because poor results will not be implemented.  Increasing the proportion 
of research projects that succeed depends on better support from Program Officers.  
Although POs are knowledgeable and well meaning, this does not mean they are good 
coaches, or disciplined enough to monitor frequently. Sometimes they want to monitor 
more frequently, but do not have the time because they are working in too many 
countries, thus limiting the number of field visits they can make to each project.  
Working in fewer countries will result in less travel stress on POs, and the ability to 
spend more time coaching individual recipients.  It also offers the advantage of synergy, 
as the results gathered for one research project in a particular country can frequently feed 
into another.  Finally, it will help IDRC work with governments to implement research 
results, because the more time spent working in the country will improve relationships 




Additional core-competencies necessary for this full-range positioning are coaching skills 
for better monitoring, and skills in disseminating and implementing projects and policy. 




On the basis of forgoing analysis, the four key strategic objectives for IDRC over the next 
five years are: 
 
• Balancing its operational budget within a year; 
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• Attaining an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by recipients;  
• Setting-up a research dissemination and policy-uptake branch within two years; 
• Cutting by 50 per cent the number of countries in which new projects will be 
supported by fiscal year 2002-03.      
 
It is unfair to suggest that, within IDRC, there has never been any discussion of the 
forgoing objectives or the analysis that led to them. Certainly, a few IDRC staff-members 
have raised the issue of poor monitoring. Recently, a memorandum about clearly 
disseminating IDRC research results was issued by the President’s office. However, the 
issues have never been linked in an integrated way, or developed into an action plan that 
recognizes their critical importance. Not surprising, the one exception is cutting costs.  
IDRC is already strategically taking swift action to cut costs by means of an operational-
review working group. The group proposed 10 high-potential initiatives, and then 
narrowed their focus down to cutting IDRC’s regional offices, reducing free-services 
offered by the library, and outsourcing IDRC publications.  So far, this strategic objective 
has progressed well.  
Taking Action 
Action plans 
For each of the three strategic objectives, two strategic thrusts have been identified, with 
two broad action plans developed for each strategic thrust. The results are presented in 
Exhibit III. The action plans open-ended, allowing task force leaders to fill-in the details 
as they take action.   
Communicating the strategy 
At this stage, the key audience for the strategy is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, IDRC’s 
Board of Directors, its recipients and staff.  The content will be simple — IDRC will 
focus on achieving quality results, which are then implemented in a relatively small 
number of countries. The strategy’s status will be communicated in IDRC’s annual 
report. 
Barriers to implementation 
IDRC program staff will likely support the plan because it enables them to do what they 
want, which is focusing on programming, and gives them the time to do it. Some of the 
staff may resist a more disciplined monitoring strategy and schedule, but if this objective 
is supported with training, and staff are made accountable and rewarded for monitoring 
instead of developing new projects, they will come around. Some staff wedded to 
working in a region or particular country where programming will be phased-out may 
oppose the strategy, but no IDRC PO works exclusively in one country, and all will be 
given the opportunity to begin working in another.  The most significant barrier will be 
political – some countries may put pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prevent 
IDRC from withdrawing programming. However, IDRC can resist this pressure, since it 
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is an independent Crown Corporation, not bound by the same rules or political 
considerations as CIDA or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Follow up Activities 
Immediate follow up 
The strategic plan will begin by publishing the agenda, communicating the strategy to all 
employees through meetings in head-office and the regional offices, and appointing a 
task force led by a champion for each strategic objective. The task force will further 
develop the strategic plan by setting up schedules and appointing champions for each 
strategic thrust.  
Short-term follow up activities (within three months) 
Funding for the action plan will be built into next year’s operational budget. Each 
strategic objective task force will meet quarterly to review progress and refine the plan.  
Periodic follow up 
Each task force team and champion will be evaluated annually on their performance. The 




IDRC does have a corporate strategy and program framework for 2000-2005.  However, 
the CSPF is more an operational plan than a strategic plan because it describes the 
necessary corporate goals for achieving IDRC’s mandate, and identifies subject areas 
where IDRC will support programs. It is not strategic because the framework does not 
respond to the make-or-break issues concerning IDRC’s external opportunities and 
threats, nor does it address IDRC’s internal strengths and weaknesses. In particular, 
IDRC could be eliminated by the Canadian government or suffer further budget cuts 
because it barely registers on the radar screens of Canadian taxpayers, and because it has 
relatively few concrete development successes.  In addition to cutting costs to balance its 
budget, which IDRC is already doing, this document proposes three strategic objectives 
to be implemented over the next five years: 
 
 
• Attaining an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by recipients;  
• Setting-up a research dissemination and policy-uptake branch within two years; and, 
• Cutting by 50 per cent the number of countries where new projects will be supported 
by fiscal year 2002-03.      
 
 7
The five-year strategic plan should be refined each year, and then replaced with a new 
plan at the end of the period.  IDRC must institutionalize a formal strategic planning 
process that responds to critical issues in a pro-active, holistic and methodical manner, 
instead of its current reactive, ad-hoc and disparate response.   
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Verbatim Excerpts from IDRC’s Corporate Strategy and Program 
Framework 
2000 –2005.   
 
The IDRC Act of 1970 provides IDRC with its legal mandate (IDRC Act, 1970) "...to 
initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the developing 
regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting knowledge to the 
economic and social advancement of those regions...". The mission of IDRC will 
remain "empowerment through knowledge" -- helping people of developing countries 
create, adapt, and acquire the knowledge they judge to be critical to their own prosperity, 
security and equity. The Centre will retain the principles of sustainable and equitable 
development as a foundation for all its programming, and continue to recognize respect 
for human rights as an integral part of development.  
 
Strategic Goals: 2000 - 2005  
 
• IDRC will strengthen and help to mobilize the indigenous research capacity of 
developing countries, especially directed to achieving greater social and economic 
equity, better management of the environment and natural resources, and more 
equitable access to information.  
 
• IDRC will foster and support the production, dissemination, and application of 
research results leading to policies and technologies to enhance the lives of people in 
developing countries.  
 
• IDRC will explore new opportunities and build selectively on past investments within 
its new program framework.  
Guiding Principles  
 
• A number of principles derived from the IDRC Act and the Centre’s experience will 
guide us as we implement our framework:  
 
• The Centre will continue to respond to the priorities and needs expressed by those in 
developing countries and to exercise our own judgement in deciding whether to enter 
major new areas.  
 
• The Centre will continue to focus its greatest attention on supporting research carried 
out by Southern researchers.  
 
• To improve research capacity, the Centre will concentrate on human resources and 
will strengthen existing institutions and the climate for research in developing 
countries. It will devolve responsibility to institutions in the South.  
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• The Centre will continue to rely heavily on the creative judgement of its staff.  
 
• The Centre will explore more actively the potential for research... into the means for 
applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge (quoted from the 
1970 Act) to development problems.  
 
• The Centre will sustain the institutional transformation it underwent in 1995 and will 
continue to embrace a wide range of approaches to research and a flexible 
understanding of the nature of research. Where circumstances permit, IDRC will play 
a catalytic role by convening the principal players with knowledge of and interest in 
solving a particular problem.  
 
• The Centre will ensure that it supports research that takes account of gender. It will 




A set of activities called program complements will continue to play a critical role in 
the Centre’s work. They are:  
   
 
• Support of collaborative "knowledge-based" partnerships between Canadian 
institutions and those in the South.  
       
• Partnerships with other donors, the most important of which has been with the 
Canadian International Development Agency, and with the private sector.  
 
• In-house expertise and a field presence in seven offices in the South.  
 
• Evaluation as a tool for learning and decision-making about research.  
 
• The provision of research information to the Centre’s Southern partners.  
 
Program Framework  
 
IDRC’s programming framework is not a plan, but presents key areas from which 
program choices will be made. It also incorporates considerable flexibility to respond to 
issues not yet identified. The three broad Corporate Program Areas are:  
   
 
• Social and Economic Equity  
• Environment and Natural Resource Management  
• Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for Development  
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Exhibit II 
IDRC SWOT Analysis 
 
Opportunities 
• Elimination of Canadian federal deficit 
• Increased recognition of importance of research for socio-economic success 
• Information and Communication Technologies to increase efficiency  
 
Threats 
• Elimination by the Canadian government 
• Continued Cuts to Parliamentary Appropriation 
• IDRC not well known by Canadian Public/Decision-makers  
Strengths 
• World-class experts amongst its staff 
• Simple, easily-understood, and attractive mission 
• Extensive network of contacts amongst researchers and other donors 
Weaknesses 
• Insufficient project monitoring resulting in relatively few concrete, visible 
development successes 
• Moving past research to dissemination, implementation of research results, and policy 
change 
• Programming stretched over too many countries
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Exhibit III 
Strategic Objective: Attain an 80 per cent monitoring approval rate by 
recipients within five years  
Strategic Thrust: Set-up guidelines for monitoring in the field 
Action Plan 1—Identify how successful projects were monitored  
 Who: Director Evaluation Unit  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Action Plan 2—Develop Monitoring Training Program for POs 
 Who: Director Evaluation Unit  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Strategic Thrust: Set-up guidelines for monitoring from the head-office 
Action Plan 1—Identify format for concise, monthly reports 
 Who: Director—Environmental and Natural Resources Area  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Action Plan 2—Develop minimum tele-conference schedule 




 How much: 
Exhibit III, Con’t 
Strategic Objective: Set-up a post-project research dissemination and 
policy-uptake branch within two years   
Strategic Thrust: Develop concept for branch 
Action Plan 1—Develop research dissemination plan 
 Who: Newly Hired VP for Branch  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Action Plan 2—Study development policy branches in other 
donor organizations 
 Who: Newly Hired VP for Branch   
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Strategic Thrust: Staff and set-up up branch 
Action Plan 1—Identify required qualifications of staff 
 Who: Newly Hired VP for Branch   
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Action Plan 2—Recruit and hire staff 




 How much: 
Exhibit III, Con’t 
Strategic Objective: Cut the number of countries in which new projects will 
be commenced by one-third. 
Strategic Thrust:  Identify in which countries IDRC will support projects        
Action Plan 1—Identify the criteria for choosing the countries  
 Who: VP Programs  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Action Plan 2—Go through a strategic planning session to 
choose them 
 Who: VP Programs   
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
Strategic Thrust: Develop an action plan for withdrawing from those countries 
Action Plan 1—Identify how quickly in each country IDRC will 
withdraw 
 Who: Regional Director   
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
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Action Plan 2—Develop a communication plan to inform 
countries of planned withdrawal 
 Who: Regional Director  
 How: 
 When: 
 How much: 
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